Regarding the 'Hole Argument' and the 'Problem of Time' by Gryb, Sean & Thebault, Karim P Y
                          Gryb, S., & Thebault, K. P. Y. (2016). Regarding the 'Hole Argument' and
the 'Problem of Time'. Philosophy of Science, 83(4), 563-584.
https://doi.org/10.1086/687262
Peer reviewed version
License (if available):
CC BY-NC
Link to published version (if available):
10.1086/687262
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online
via University of Chicago at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/687262. Please refer to any
applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
Regarding the ‘Hole Argument’
and the ‘Problem of Time’
Sean Gryb∗1 and Karim P. Y. The´bault†2
1Institute for Mathematics, Astrophysics and Particle Physics, Radboud
University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
2Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, United Kingdom
December 5, 2015
Abstract
The canonical formalism of general relativity affords a particu-
larly interesting characterisation of the infamous hole argument. It
also provides a natural formalism in which to relate the hole argu-
ment to the problem of time in classical and quantum gravity. In
this paper we examine the connection between these two much dis-
cussed problems in the foundations of spacetime theory along two
interrelated lines. First, from a formal perspective, we consider the
extent to which the two problems can and cannot be precisely and
distinctly characterised. Second, from a philosophical perspective, we
consider the implications of various responses to the problems, with
a particular focus upon the viability of a ‘deflationary’ attitude to the
relationalist/substantivalist debate regarding the ontology of space-
time. Conceptual and formal inadequacies within the representative
language of canonical gravity will be shown to be at the heart of both
the canonical hole argument and the problem of time. Interesting and
fruitful work at the interface of physics and philosophy relates to the
challenge of resolving such inadequacies.
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1 Introduction
The ‘hole argument’ is an interpretational dilemma in the foundations of
general relativity. Although the argument originates with Einstein, the
terms of the modern debate were set by Earman and Norton (1987). In
essence, Earman and Norton argue that a certain view on the ontology
of spacetime (‘substantivalism’) leads to an underdetermination problem
when pairs of solutions are connected by a certain sub-set of symmetries
of the theory (‘hole diffeomorphisms’). The dilemma is then either to give
up substantivalism or accept that that there are distinct states of affairs
which no possible observation could distinguish. The problem is supposed
to derive purely from interpretational questions: it is assumed throughout
that the formalism is rich enough to give an unambiguous representation
of the relevant mathematical objects and maps – it is just that different
interpretations lead to different such choices.
The ‘problem of time’ is a cluster of interpretational and formal issues
in the foundations of general relativity relating to both the representation
of time in the classical canonical formalism, and to the quantization of
the theory. The problem was first noticed by Bergmann and Dirac in the
late 1950s, and is still a topic of debate in contemporary physics (Isham
1992, Kuchar˘ 1991, Anderson 2012). Although there is not broad agree-
ment about precisely what the problem is supposed to be, one plausible
formulation of (at least one aspect of) the problem is in terms of a dilemma
in which one must choose between an ontology without time, by treating
the Hamiltonian constraints as purely gauge generating, and an underde-
termination problem, by treating the Hamiltonian constraints as generating
physical change (Pooley 2006, The´bault 2012). The problem derives, for the
most part, from a formal deficiency in the representational language of the
canonical theory: one cannot unambiguously specify refoliation symme-
tries as invariances of mathematical objects we define on phase space. We
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do not have a representation of refoliation symmetries in terms of a group
action on phase space curves.
What do these two problems have to do with each other? In this pa-
per, we argue that, from a certain perspective, they are essentially the same
problem clothed in different language. The adoption of this perspective
depends upon three key steps – all of which are contestable – but each
of which is plausible. The first step requires accepting a certain view on
the role of mathematics in guiding interpretational dispute within phys-
ical theory, and is inspired by a recent article by Weatherall (2015) (see
§2.1). The second step requires the adoption of the canonical formulation
of general relativity as the primary forum for ontological debate regarding
classical gravity (see §2.2). This is motivated by the third step, whereby the
ultimate goal of all debate regarding the ontology of classical spacetime is
assumed to be the construction of a quantum theory of gravity (see §3).
Thus, methodologically speaking, much of what we say depends upon ac-
cepting a pragmatic view as regards the ontology of classical gravity and a
canonical view as regards to the quantization of gravity. To those who will
follow us this far – we are grateful for the company.
2 The Hole Argument
2.1 A Covariant Deflation
In this section, we give a brief reconstruction of the aspects of the argu-
ments of Weatherall (2015) that are relevant to our purpose. Although we
are sympathetic to them, we will not argue explicitly in favour of Weather-
all’s negative conclusions regarding the cogency of the hole argument.
Rather, we take his work to provide a clear means to differentiate two
species of interpretational debate: one of significant pragmatic value, one
of little. Let us begin with quoting some important passages of a more
general methodological character:
...the default sense of “sameness” or “equivalence” of mathe-
matical models in physics should be the sense of equivalence
given by the mathematics used in formulating those models...
mathematical models of a physical theory are only defined up
to isomorphism, where the standard of isomorphism is given by
the mathematical theory of whatever mathematical objects the
theory takes as its models...isomorphic mathematical models in
physics should be taken to have the same representational capac-
ities. By this I mean that if a particular mathematical model may
be used to represent a given physical situation, then any isomor-
phic model may be used to represent that situation equally well.
[pp.3-4 italics added]
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Weatherall gives here a normative prescription regarding the kinds of de-
bate that we should have about the interpretation of physical theory. Math-
ematics provides us with a standard of equivalence in terms of an appro-
priate type of isomorphism. We should take this standard to dictate when
mathematically models have identical representational capacities. Given
that, arguments which depend upon interpreting isomorphic models as
having different representational capacities are rendered ill-conceived. So
far as it goes, this is a reasonable, if controversial, viewpoint. Our strategy
here will be to provisionally accept such a view and see what happens to
the debates regarding the hole argument and problem of time. We will re-
turn to the discussion of wider methodological morals in the final section.
Following Weatherall (2015), we can construct a version of the Earman
and Norton hole argument as follows. Consider a relativistic spacetime
as given by a Lorentzian manifold (M, gµν).1 Consider a ‘hole’ to be de-
fined by some open proper set with compact closure O ⊂ M. A ‘hole
diffeomorphism’ is a map ψ : M → M with the properties that i) ψ acts
as the identity on M −O; and ii) ψ is not the identity on O. Given such
a hole diffeomorphism we can define a metric tensor g˜µν in terms of the
action of its push forward ψ? on the original metric, i.e., g˜µν = ψ?(gµν). We
have thus defined a transformation, ψ˜ : (M, gµν) → (M, g˜µν), producing
a second relativistic spacetime which is isometric to the first. Given that
these are both Lorentzian manifolds and that isometry is the ‘standard of
isomorphism’ for Lorentzian manifolds, if we follow Weatherall’s method-
ological prescription above, we should take (M, gµν) and (M, g˜µν) to have
identical representational capacities. Yet, according to Weatherall, the crux
of the ‘hole argument’ depends upon there being a view as to the ontology
of the theory within which (M, gµν) and (M, g′µν) have different represen-
tational capacities. In particular, it is assumed by Earman and Norton that
a ‘spacetime substantivalist’ takes the two models to represent different as-
signments of the metric to points within O. This, according to Weatherall,
is illegitimate since such a difference relies upon a comparison in terms of
the identity map, 1M : M→ M, which is not the appropriate standard of isomor-
phism for the objects under consideration. Moreover, the supposed dilemma
rests upon conflating one sense of equivalence (in terms of ψ˜) with another
sense of inequivalence (in terms of 1M ):
...one cannot have it both ways. Insofar as one wants to claim
that these Lorentzian manifolds are physically equivalent...one
has to use ψ˜ to establish a standard of comparison between
points. And relative to this standard, the two Lorentzian man-
1For simplicity sake, throughout this paper we will take ourselves to be dealing with
general relativity in vacuo. The Lorentzian manifolds in question will thus be solutions to
the vacuum Einstein field equations. It is reasonable to assume that the arguments of this
paper will apply, mutatis mutandis, to the matter case – in which, of course, the ‘hole’
would take on a more physical significance.
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ifolds agree on the metric at every point–there is no ambigu-
ity, and no indeterminism...Meanwhile, insofar as one wants to
claim that these Lorentzian manifolds assign different values of
the metric to each point, one must use a different standard of
comparison. And relative to this standard—that given by 1M—
the two Lorentzian manifolds are not equivalent. One way or
the other, the Hole Argument seems to be blocked. [p.13]
This is no doubt a rather controversial conclusion: Earman and Nor-
ton’s hole argument has been the focus of debate in the philosophy of
spacetime for almost thirty years. Could it really rely on such a simple mis-
application of mathematics? As noted above, the purpose of the present
paper is not to enter into a sustained critical analysis of Weatherall’s paper.
Rather, we will briefly consider a plausible line of criticism and then move
on the positive moral that we take both Weatherall and his critics to agree
upon.
In the definition of ‘same representational capacities’ quoted above
Weatherall could mean two subtly different things. In particular, when
we say that either of a pair of isomorphic models may be used to represent
a given situation equally well, there is an ambiguity as to how restrictive
we are being. We could mean that, taken in isolation, the two models
can always represent any given situation equally well but allow that, taken
together, they may represent different situations (for example, once the
representational role of one model is fixed, the other could be taken to
represent a different possibility). We could also mean that the two mod-
els must, in all contexts, always have to retain the ability to represent all
physical scenarios equally well. If Weatherall means the former, then the
hole argument is no longer ‘blocked’.2 If he means the latter, it is arguable
that his notion of ‘same representational’ capacities is too restrictive – see
(Roberts 2014).
These plausible lines of criticism not withstanding, we think there are
important lessons to be learned from considering such a ‘deflationary’ re-
sponse to the hole argument. In our view, debate about the ontology of
physical theory is most fruitful and interesting when driven by representa-
tional ambiguity. If we accept that within a given domain there is a natural
standard of mathematical equivalence, and that this standard is the appro-
priate guide to representational capacity, then the work left for interpre-
tative philosophers of physics is only ever likely to be of marginal impor-
tance to the articulation and development of the theory. However, if there
is not a natural standard of mathematical equivalence within the relevant
domain, or there are reasons to believe that the standard (or standards)
available are not good guides for representational capacity, then interpre-
tative philosophy of physics gains an important role in the articulation and
development of the theory. Whether or not Weatherall’s arguments ‘block’
2Thanks to Oliver Pooley (personal communication) for clarifying this.
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the hole argument, we think it is reasonable to say that they highlight pre-
cisely the reasons why the hole argument is not seen as a topic of particular
importance to contemporary physics.3
2.2 A Canonical Reinflation
Following on from the discussion of Belot and Earman (1999, 2001) and
the debate between Rickles (2005, 2006) and Pooley (2006), we can con-
sider a version of the hole argument reconstructed within the canonical or
‘ADM’ (Arnowitt et al. 1960, Arnowitt et al. 1962) formulation of general
relativity.4 Following the treatment of Thiemann (2007), the first step in
constructing a (matter free) ‘3+1’ space and time formalism is to make the
assumption that the manifold M has a topology M ∼= R× σ where σ is a
three-dimensional manifold that we will assume to be closed but have an
otherwise arbitrary (differentiable) topology. Consider the diffeomorphism
X : R× σ → M; (t, x) → X(t, x). Given this, we can define the foliation of
M into hypersurfaces Σt := Xt(σ) where t ∈ R and Xt : σ → M is an
embedding defined by Xt(x) := X(t, x) for the coordinates xa on σ. What
we are interested in specifically is the foliation of a spacetime, M, into
spacelike hypersurfaces, Σt, and, thus, we restrict ourselves to spacelike
embeddings (this restriction is already implicit in our choice of topology
for M) . Decomposing the Einstein–Hilbert action in terms of tensor fields
defined upon the hypersurfaces Σ and the coefficients used to parametrise
the embedding (the lapse and shift below) leads to a ‘3+1’ Lagrangian for-
malism of general relativity. Recasting this into canonical terms gives us
the ADM action:
S =
1
κ
∫
R
dt
∫
σ
d3x{q˙abPab − [NaHa + |N|H]}. (1)
Here κ = 16piG (where G is Newton’s constant and we assume units where
c = 1), qab is a Riemannian metric tensor field on Σ, and Pab its canonical
momenta defined by the usual Legendre transformation. N and Na are
multipliers called the lapse and shift. Ha and H are the momentum and
3We take this view to be broadly in the same sprit as Curiel’s (2015) response to the
hole argument: ‘diffeomorphic freedom in the presentation of relativistic spacetimes does
not ipso facto require philosophical elucidation, in so far as it in no way prevents us from
focusing on and investigating what is of true physical relevance in systems that general
relativity models’ (p.11).
4The canonical formalism has its origin in the work of Paul Dirac and Peter Bergmann
towards the construction of a quantum theory of gravity. Important early work can be
found in (Bergmann 1949) and (Dirac 1950), the crucial result was first given in (Dirac
1958). According to Salisbury (2012) the same Hamiltonian was obtained independently
at about the same time by B. DeWitt and also by J. Anderson. Also see (Salisbury 2007,
Salisbury 2010) for an account of little-known early work due to Le´on Rosenfeld.
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Hamiltonian constraint functions of the form:
Ha := −2qacDbPbc, (2)
H :=
κ√
det(q)
[qacqbd − 12qabqcd]P
abPcd −
√
det(q)
R
κ
. (3)
It can be shown that, given a Lorentzian spacetime as represented by the
geometry (M, gµν), if the constraint equations are satisfied on every space-
like hypersurface, then gµν will also satisfy the vacuum Einstein field equa-
tions. Conversely, it can be shown that, given a (M, gµν) that satisfies the
vacuum Einstein field equations, the constraint equations, that are given by
the weak vanishing of Ha and H, will be satisfied on all spacelike hyper-
surfaces of M (see (Isham 1992) for details of both proofs). The solutions
presented to us by the canonical and covariant formalisms are equivalent
provided the covariant spacetime can be expressed as a sequence of space-like hy-
persurfaces. This requirement is equivalent to insisting that the spacetimes
in question are restricted to be globally hyperbolic (Geroch 1970) and is di-
rectly connected to the topological restriction M ∼= R× σ that was made in
setting up the canonical formalism. Thus, there is a subset of the covariant
solutions that cannot be represented within the canonical formalism.
There is a similar partial inequivalence between the formalisms at the
level of symmetries, and again this difference relates to the topological
restriction required to set up the 3+1 split. Whereas the covariant action is
invariant under the full set of spacetime diffeomorphisms, Diff(M), in the
canonical formulation, it is only a subset of these transformations that is
realised: those diffeomorphisms that preserve the spacelike nature of the
embedding.5 We can examine this difference more carefully by considering
the Lie algebroid that the constraints generate:
{~H(~N), ~H( ~N′)} = −κ~H(L~N~N′), (4)
{~H(~N), H(N)} = −κH(L~N N), (5)
{H(N), H(N′)} = −κ~H(F(N, N′, q)), (6)
where H(N) and ~H(~N) are smeared versions of the constraints (e.g.
~H(~N) :=
∫
σ d
3xNaHa) and F(N, N′, q) = qab(NN′,b − N′N,b). The pres-
ence of structure functions on the right hand side of Equation (6) is what
prevents closure as an algebra, and means that the associated set of trans-
formations on phase space are a groupoid rather than a group. This math-
ematical subtlety will be of great importance to our discussion. When the
5The origin and nature of the difference between the symmetries of the canonical and
covariant formalism is a complex issue. In addition to the restriction to diffeomorphisms
that preserve the spacelike nature of the embedding, the canonical formalism also ne-
glects: i) field-dependent infinitesimal coordinate transformations; and ii) ‘large diffeo-
morphisms’ that are not connected with the identity. See (Isham and Kuchar 1985b, Pons
et al. 1997, Pons et al. 2010).
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vacuum equations of motion and the constraints are satisfied, the groupoid
of transformations generated by the constraints is equivalent to a subgroup
of spacetime diffeomorphism group consisting of those diffeomorphisms
that preserve the spacelike nature of the embedding and are connected to
the identity.
The ‘standard interpretation’ of the representational roles of objects
within the canonical formalism is as follows: a) Points on the constraint
surface, defined by the sub-manifold of phase space where the constraints
hold, represent Riemannian three geometries (together with the relevant
momentum data); b) Integral curves of the Hamilton vector field of the
Hamiltonian constraint on the constraint surface (dynamical curves for
short) represent Lorentzian four geometries; c) Points connected by inte-
gral curves of vector fields associated with each family of constraints have
identical representational capacities. There are problems with all three of
these assignments of representational roles to objects within the canonical
gravity formalism. In particular, with regard to a) and b), it is far from
clear that points or curves should really be understood as playing such a
simple role – surely we need to consider the embedding data also? Fur-
thermore, with regard to c), justification for the definition of equivalence
classes is needed: this notion of ‘gauge orbits’ derives from other applica-
tion of the theory of constrained Hamiltonian mechanics (see in particular
(Dirac 1964)) and we should require explicit physical reasons for its ex-
tension to the case of canonical gravity. Moreover, since the Hamiltonian
of canonical general relativity is also a constraint, the integral curves that
the standard interpretation implies should be identified as gauge orbits
will also be identified as solutions! It will prove instructive to proceed
as follows: we will assume a) and b) to be reasonable for the time being,
and then investigate c) by considering the action of the constraints in the
context of two canonical reconstructions of the hole argument.
A first version of the ‘canonical hole argument’, which seems to be
largely what Rickles (2005, §2) has in mind,6 runs as follows. Consider a
fixed foliation and define a single global Hamiltonian function that evolves
the canonical data on three-geometries. Now consider a point on the con-
straint surface. This point corresponds to a particular specification of the
metric tensor field, qab, and its associated canonical momenta Pab. Given
this, we can define a three-dimensional spatial geometry by the three di-
mensional Riemannian manifold (σ, qab). This object represents an instan-
taneous spatial slice of some physically possible spacetime. Because of the
topological restriction, we know that such a slice is also a Cauchy surface,
and thus can act as well-posed initial data for the spacetime in question
(provided further smoothness conditions are satisfied). Explicitly, given
6Although Rickles’ paper is mainly focused upon canonical gravity expressed in terms
of connection variables, his reconstruction of the hole argument, like that considered here,
relies solely upon the momentum constraints. We will consider Rickles’ arguments further
in the quantum context in §3.2.
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this point, together with our global Hamiltonian, we can evolve the initial
data backwards and forwards in time to get a path in phase space. We
can then understand this path as representing an Einstein spacetime as a
sequence of spatial slices.
From this setup, we can construct an underdetermination problem anal-
ogous to the hole argument. Consider a transformation of canonical vari-
ables generated by the momentum constraint:
{~H(~N), qab} = κ(L~Nqab), (7)
{~H(~N), Pab} = κ(L~NPab). (8)
The appearance of the Lie derivative on the right-hand side of each equa-
tion indicates that the momentum constraints can be understood as im-
plementing the Lie group of (infinitesimal) diffeomorphisms of Σ (Isham
and Kuchar 1985b). This fits with the ‘standard interpretation’ of the rep-
resentational roles of objects within the canonical formalism. By acting on
a point on the constraint surface with the momentum constraints (and ap-
propriate smearing functions) we generate ‘flow’ to a new point in phase
space. This new point is associated with a second three dimensional Rie-
mannian geometry (Σ, q˜ab) that will be isometric to the first. A version of
the canonical hole argument then follows from identifying canonical data
within a subset of a phase space path constituting the ‘hole region’ and
comparing two curves γ and γ˜ that differ solely in virtue of the action of
the momentum constraints in that region. One could then argue that a sub-
stantivalist about space would take the different canonical data within the
hole region to correspond to sequences of spatial geometries, say (Σ, qab)i
and (Σ, q˜ab)i, that represent different possibilities since they represent dif-
ferent assignments of the metric to spatial points on the slices. As pointed
out by Pooley (2006), such a (rather naı¨ve) spatial substantivalist position
would involve commitment to a merely haecceitistic ontological difference:
‘These histories involve exactly the same sequence of geometrical relations
being instantiated over time. The only way they differ is in terms of which
points instantiate which properties’. By all accounts, however, the two
curves γ and γ˜, will represent the same spatial ontology outside the hole
region. Thus, the spatial substantivalist is faced with the dilemma of either
giving up their ontological view or submitting to underdetermination.
So far things are looking very familiar. Essentially, all we have done
is canonically reconstruct one very specific model of the covariant hole ar-
gument where the spacetime is constrained to be globally hyperbolic and
the hole diffeomorphisms act only on spatial slices (this could be achieved
given a particular choice of smearing function). It is therefore unsurpris-
ing that Weatherall’s deflationary argument can be brought to bear upon
this canonical version of the hole argument with equal force as upon its
covariant cousin. Since each of the (Σ, qab)i and (Σ, q˜ab)i are isometric as
Riemannian manifolds, and isometry is the ‘standard of isomorphism’ for
9
Riemannian manifolds, we should take them to have identical representa-
tional capacities. Moreover, the supposed ontological difference between
the two spatial geometries relies upon a comparison in terms of the identity
map 1Σ : Σ→ Σ, which is not the appropriate standard of isomorphism for
the objects under consideration. Thus, we should not make interpretive ar-
guments that rely upon the (Σ, qab)i and (Σ, q˜ab)i representing distinct on-
tologies. To the extent that the covariant hole argument can be deflated in
Weatherall’s terms, so can this canonical version. So far as the momentum
constraints go, the ‘standard interpretation’ of the representational roles
of objects within the canonical formalism fits well with a Weatherall-style
response to the hole argument.
However, following Pooley (2006, §2), it is questionable whether the
canonical hole argument should be given purely in terms of the action of
the momentum constraints. After all, the restriction to a ‘fixed embedding’
hole diffeomorphism is extremely strong: why should we not consider
transformations that do not preserve the foliation? When thinking about
the hole argument in the canonical formalism, one should surely try to re-
construct all the hole diffeomorphism that one can; i.e., one should include
those which may deform the embedding so long as it remains space-like.
To do this, one must also consider the transformations generated by the
Hamiltonian constraints. This is where things become more difficult within
the canonical formalism. In Equations (7) and (8) above, the connection
between the momentum constraints and infinitesimal diffeomorphisms is
made explicit by the occurrence of the Lie derivatives of the canonical vari-
ables in the direction defined by the shift multiplier, L~Nqab and L~NP
ab. The
form of these expressions indicate that the phase-space action of ~H(~N) can
be associated with diffeomorphisms of the original spacetime manifold,
M, tangential to the embedded hypersurfaces Σt. Clearly, this does not ex-
haust the set of possible diffeomorphisms that can be represented within
the canonical formalism since we may also consider diffeomorphisms of M
that are orthogonal to Σt – these would be the ‘time bit’ of the spacetime
diffeomorphism group, as opposed to the ‘space bit’ . In for us to represent
the full set of the canonical symmetries of the theory, we might therefore
hope that the Hamiltonian constraints can be associated with an action of
the form: ‘{H(N), qab} = κ(LNnqab)’, where nµ is the unit normal vector to
Σt, and n = nµ . However, such an equation is not found in explicit calcu-
lation – see (Thiemann 2007) Eq. (1.3.4) and (1.3.12). Rather, what is found
is that, in the case of the metric variable qab, the expected LNnqab piece
emerges only ‘on shell’ – i.e., only when the equations of motion hold –
and relative to an embedding. We therefore have that, whereas the diffeo-
morphisms associated with the momentum constraints can be understood
as purely kinematical symmetries of the three geometries Σ (irrespective of
whether the equations of motion hold), those associated with the Hamil-
tonian constraint are properly considered symmetries of, not only entire
10
spacetimes, but of spacetimes which are solutions. (We will return to the
problem of foliation symmetry and the Hamiltonian constraints in §3.1).
This creates an immediate problem for the ‘standard interpretation’ of
the representational roles of objects within the canonical formalism. In
particular, unlike in the case of momentum constraints, for the case of the
Hamiltonian constraints, the explicit form of the constraint’s phase space
action does not justify an interpretation in which points connected by inte-
gral curves of vector fields associated with constraints have identical rep-
resentational capacities – i.e., c) above is now unsupported.
Essentially, the problem is that, in the ‘standard interpretation’, the ob-
jects that represent spacetimes are dynamical curves on the constraint sur-
face, and for curves related by the action of the Hamiltonian constraints we
do not have a standard of isomorphism that is given by the mathematical
theory of the objects at hand: i.e. phase space curves. This is because the
Hamiltonian constraints do provide us with anything like a representation
of refoliation symmetries as a group action on phase space curves. This
issue is notwithstanding our ability to reconstruct the embedding and de-
fine a refoliation based upon phase space data. That is, given phase space
data, and provided we are ‘on shell’, we can reconstruct the lapse and
shift multipliers by solving the ‘thin sandwich problem’ (Giulini 1999).
From there, we are able to define the embedding and then, as indicated
above, unambiguously specifiy a refoliation transformation. However, that
the phase space data are a sufficient starting point to define a mapping be-
tween phase curves representing spacetimes related by a refoliation, does
not automatically mean that we have an available a standard of isomorphism
between the phase space curves in question. In particular, the structure
that is preserved in a refoliation is encoded in the metric of the dynamical
spacetimes in question, and is not contained in the relevant canonical data
on their own. Based upon the data, we can reconstruct the embedding,
and based upon that we can specify the class of mappings that deform the
embedding whilst persevering the relevant spacetime metric (and topolog-
ical) structure. The case of refoliations in canonical gravity is thus crucially
different from spatial diffeomorphisms: refoliations are not invariances of
mathematical objects we define on phase space. This is true even if we
can reconstruct the mathematical objects that they are invariances of based
upon the phase space objects.
We can still, however, determine, given two dynamical curves, when
they are relatable by a refoliation, based purely upon the geometric struc-
ture of phase space. Consider the surface, Π, within the phase space
(qab, Pab) ∈ Γ, defined by satisfaction of the Hamiltonian constraint equa-
tions H = 0. The integral curves of the vector fields associated with the
Hamiltonian constraint define sub-manifolds withinΠ. Formally speaking,
they foliate the presymplectic manifold Π into symplectic sub-manifolds,
L, that are the leaves of the foliation. The geometry of the situation is then
such that any two curves that lie within the same leaf will be relatable
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by some possible refoliation transformation, given the appropriate sup-
plemental data regarding the embedding of the two sequences of hyper-
surfaces into a spacetime. Thus, although at the level of phase space we
do not have an isomorphism between curves, we do still have a means, at
the level of phase space, by which we can say that they are constrained to
represent objects that are observationally indistinguishable.
We can now consider a ‘pure Hamiltonian constraint’ hole argument.
Consider a pair of canonical solutions in terms of two dynamical curves in
phase space. Each of these curves represents a sequence of three geome-
tries that we can then further take to represent a spacetime. If these two
curves are integral curves of the vector fields associated with the Hamilto-
nian constraints and overlap for some nontrivial section and both lie entirely
inside a particular leaf L, then we can reconstruct a ‘pure Hamiltonian con-
straint’ hole argument where we take the momentum constraints to have a
trivial action our two curves, but still can consider an underdetermination
scenario. One might think, in these circumstances, that Weatherall’s defla-
tionary strategy might be able to block this ‘pure Hamiltonian constraint’
hole argument too. However, things are not quite so easy this time. The
mathematical objects that we are using to represent spacetimes are curves
in phase space and not four dimensional Lorenizan manifolds. In order to
actually reconstruct a four dimensional Lorenizan manifold from a phase
space curve, one is required to specify embedding data. And so long as
we are talking about representation of spacetimes via the pure phase space
formalism, there is no readily available mathematical standard of isomor-
phism. Whereas isometry between Riemannian three manifolds leads nat-
urally to treating points connected by the momentum constraints as having
the same representational capacity, there is no analogous mathematical pre-
scription for curves. We have no representation of refoliation symmetries
as a group action on phase space curves.
We can consider a position of ‘straightforward’ substantivalism where
spacetime points have some basic status such that different embeddings of
spatial slices into spacetime would then correspond to different physical
possibilities. A hole argument could then be reconstructed along Earman
and Norton’s lines, since we could have underdetermination given an ap-
propriate class of embedding non-preserving hole diffeomophisms. The
usual options for a ‘sophisticated’ version of substantivalism would then
be back on the table and one could, if one is so inclined, pursue a response
to the hole argument in terms of anti-Haecceitism,7 or perhaps some other
option. What is more, in the context of this pure Hamiltonian constraint
canonical hole argument, the spectre of underdetermination looms over
both relationalist and substantivalist interpretations alike. In particular, as
pointed out by Pooley (2001), in the context of the canonical formalism,
7This strategy is adopted in, for example, (Maudlin 1988, Butterfield 1989, Brighouse
1994). See (Pooley 2013) for more details.
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Machian relationalism about time is also confronted by indeterminism, un-
less some other steps are taken – see also (The´bault 2012). Our point here
is not to reopen these debates, nor to blunt Weatherall’s attack on the hole
argument per se. Rather than resurrecting the hole argument with new
splendour, we should seek to find a formalism fit to deflate it again! From
this perspective, the canonical formalism is deficient precisely because it
does not provide us with a natural standard of isomorphism for paths in
phase space. The role of interpretational work is then to aid us in finding
an adequate formalism, not to drive different articulations of the formalism
once it is found.
The two key conclusions from our analysis thus far are as follows: i)
there is a version of the hole argument within the canonical formalism
that is still well defined despite the failure to find an appropriate standard
of isomorphism for the mathematical objects in question (paths in phase
space); and ii) this problem essentially derives from the ambiguity regard-
ing the canonical representation of diffeomophisms that do not preserve
the embedding of spatial hypersurfaces into spacetimes. We have no rep-
resentation of refoliation symmetries as a group action on phase space
curves. On our reading, this is simply a restatement of one aspect of the
problem of time, to which we now turn.
3 The Problem of Time
3.1 The Problem of Refoliation
Controversy surrounding the problem of time relates as much to its ori-
gin as to the purported solutions. On one influential view8, the problem
is inherent in the application of Dirac’s theory of constrained Hamilto-
nian mechanics, in which the first class constraints generate ‘unphysical’
gauge transformations, to a theory in which the Hamiltonian is defined in
terms of first class constraints. Most pertinently, since it is the Hamiltonian
constraints that generate the evolution between dynamically related hy-
persurfaces, if these constraints are understood as ‘gauge generating’, then
we can jump straight to the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that ‘time is
gauge’. However, it is not difficult to see that such a reading is not well
supported. For one thing, there are good reasons to doubt that the theorem
upon which the statement that ‘first class constraints generate unphysical
gauge transformations’ is based applies to theories with Hamiltonian con-
8Espoused in particular by Rovelli (2004) but also echoed in much of the philosophical
literature (Belot and Earman 1999, Belot and Earman 2001, Earman 2002, Belot 2007).
Dissent from this ‘received view’, for various reasons, can be found in (Barbour 1994,
Kuchar˘ 1991, Maudlin 2002, Pons 2005, The´bault 2011, The´bault 2012, Gryb and The´bault
2011, Gryb and The´bault 2014, Gryb and The´bault 2015b, Gryb and The´bault 2015a, Pons,
Salisbury, and Sundermeyer 2010, Pitts 2014b, Pitts 2014a).
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straints (Barbour and Foster 2008). For another, as we have already seen,
the connection between spacetime diffeomorphisms and the Hamiltonian
constraints is not a direct or simple one. In fact, if anything, the problem
of time stems from the problem that we cannot write an evolution equation
using the phase space action of Hamiltonian constraints that would imply
either dynamics or ‘unphysical’ change. The problem derives from the idea
that we should be able to represent a refoliation as an invariance of objects
defined purely within phase space, and thus it is worth considering what
we mean by a refoliation symmetry in a little more detail.
The infinite family of Hamiltonian constraints in canonical general rel-
ativity is connected to local time-diffeomorphism invariance. The set of local
time-diffeomorphisms includes two very different types of transformations
that are important to distinguish. Canonical general relativity involves
specification of geometrical information relating to both canonical data on
sequences of spatial hypersurfaces and the embeddings of these hypersur-
faces into spacetimes. Local time-diffeomorphisms are a set of symmetry
transformations that includes both reparametrization transformations that
preserve embeddings and refoliation transformations that do not preserve
embeddings. The embedding preserving transformations reparametrize
phase space curves without changing their image. This means that the
sense in which reparametrizations can lead to a potential ‘hole argument’ is
a very weak one: one can have underdetermination in the sense of multiple
substantivalist ontologies of time being compatible with an initial specifica-
tion, but one does not have indeterminism in the sense of these ontologies
corresponding to different phase space curves – see (Gryb and The´bault
2015b, §3.1) for more discussion of this point.
Refoliations, on the other hand, change the image of phase space curves
and so can lead to underdetermination problems with ontologies corre-
sponding to different phase space curves. As we have already seen, such
underdetermination problems are not susceptible to a Weatherall-style de-
flation precisely because there is not an appropriate standard of isomor-
phism between the relevant mathematical objects defined on phase space.
At the level of phase space, we do not even have a unique state-by-state
representation of refoliations. This is because, in addition to a history, one
needs to specify the embedding of the phase space data into spacetime in
order to define a refoliation. Without this embedding information, it is
impossible to construct the explicit refoliation map between two histories
on phase space. Another way of viewing this issue is to consider refolia-
tions as normal deformations of three-dimensional hypersurfaces embed-
ded within four geometries (Teitelboim 1973). In that context, it is clear that
they will require a spacetime metric in order to be defined. This metric can
be defined either explicitly as spacetime geometric data or implicitly via
reconstruction of the embedding from canonical data (via solution of the
thin sandwich problem).
There are at least five natural responses to the problem of refoliation:
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I) Move to a reduced formalism; II) Use internal clocks; III) Fall back on
the covariant formalism; IV) Add new physical ingredients; and V) Add
new mathematical ingredients. All of these responses have potentially sig-
nificant implications for the representational roles of objects within the
canonical formalism, and we will consider them briefly here with particu-
lar reference to the discussion of the ‘standard view’ and the ‘reinflation’
of the hole argument considered above.
The first, reductive response is the standard response in the literature
– see in particular (Belot 2007). It is often (perhaps understandably) con-
flated with the second. The idea is that the integral curves of the vector
fields on the constraint surface associated with the Hamiltonian constraints
should be ‘quotiented out’ to form a reduced phase space. Points within
this reduced phase space are then taken to represent diffeomorphism in-
variant spacetimes since there is an bijection between points in the reduced
phase space and points in a space of diffeomorphism invariant spacetimes,
defined via the covariant formalism. However, as discussed in (The´bault
2012), the existence of such a mapping between points in two representa-
tive spaces is far from a sufficient condition for them to play equivalent
roles (although it could in some cases be taken to be necessary) since we
can trivially find such relationships between manifestly inequivalent struc-
tures. It is much more plausible for the representational role of a space
within a theory to be fixed primarily by its relationship to the represen-
tative structures from which it is derived rather than to a space utilised
in the context of a different formalism. For the case of general relativity,
therefore, it is more appropriate to consider the relationship between the
reduced phase space and the unreduced phase space as fixing the former’s
representational role. And so, we are back at the problem of interpreting
points and curves in the unreduced phase space – without first fixing such
an interpretation, the representative role of the reduced phase space should
be taken to be undefined.
The second response involves using a series of internal clocks to (ar-
bitrarily) parametrize the foliation. Correlations between the clock values
are then used to construct ‘complete observables’ (Rovelli 2002, Dittrich
2007, Dittrich 2006). There are problems with monotonicity and chaos (Dit-
trich et al. 2015) and it is not clear these can be overcome in general. Fur-
thermore, the representational role of the clock values is contested: Dittrich
and Thiemann (2007, 2009) claim that only the correlations represent physi-
cal quantities, Rovelli (2002, 2014) claims that the values themselves (partial
observables) represent quantities that can be ‘measured but not predicted’.
The Dittrich-Thiemann view is motivated by something like the standard
interpretation, and is also closely allied with the reduced view: By treating
only the correlations as physically meaningful one once more endorses an
equivalence in representational capacity between a point on the initial data
surface and an entire history. However, the different foliations are encoded
in the clock values, not the correlations. We, thus, consider that it is only on
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the Rovelli view that the problem of refoliation could, at least in principle,
be resolved via the use of internal clocks. See (Gryb and The´bault 2015a)
for further discussion of the relative merits of the Dittrich-Thiemann and
Rovelli views.
In the third response we simply rely upon correspondence to the co-
variant formalism as our guide to determine which phase space curves
should be taken to represent spacetimes related by refoliations. In fol-
lowing such an approach, we would use the covariant formalism as the
primary guide to representational capacities, and thus strip the canonical
formalism of any independent representational capacity. In this context,
the deflationary argument of Weatherall should be re-applicable: i.e., we
should be able to use the isometry between Lorentzian spacetimes in the
covariant formalism to fix the representational capacities of the phase space
curves in the canonical formalism related by refoliation. In spirit, such an
approach appears to be close to what Pons et al. (2010) and Pitts (2014a)
have in mind. It is also closely connected to approaches to the quantiza-
tion of gravity based upon the path integral, for example causal set theory
(Bombelli et al. 1987, Dowker 2005, Henson 2006), causal dynamical tri-
angulation (Loll 2001, Ambjørn et al. 2001), spin foams (Baez 1998, Perez
2013), or functional RG approaches (Lauscher and Reuter 2001).
In the fourth and fifth responses one admits that the canonical formal-
ism is deficient precisely because it does not provide us with a natural
standard of isomorphism for paths in phase space. However, rather than
falling back on the covariant formalism one seeks to enrich the canonical
theory by including either new physical ingredients (IV) or new mathe-
matical ingredients (V).
It is in the context of the fourth response that one can view the ‘Shape
Dynamics’ formalism (Gomes et al. 2011) of canonical gravity that was
originally motivated by the project of implementing the ‘Machian program’
for understanding space, shape and time in general relativity (Barbour
2003, Anderson et al. 2003, Anderson et al. 2005). The relationship between
Shape Dynamics and the problem of time is investigated in a series of pa-
pers by Gryb and The´bault (2011, 2014, 2015b, 2015a) and is also considered
(along a different line) in Barbour et al. (2014). The crucial idea in both
treatments is that, in Shape Dynamics, refoliations are ‘re-encoded’ as con-
formal transformations, and the refoliation aspect of the problem of time is
eliminated. More precisely, one moves to a new formalism ‘dual’ to the sec-
tor of canonical gravity where the spacetimes are foliable by hypersurfaces
of constant mean curvature. The constraints of this new space are a single
Hamiltonian constraint (responsible for reparameterization) together with
the usual momentum constraints, and a new set of constraints that gen-
erate (volume persevering) three-dimensional conformal transformations.
The momentum and conformal constraints are amenable to the ‘standard
interpretation’ in that it is appropriate to view points connected by integral
curves of vector fields associated with these constraints as having identi-
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cal representational capacities. Such an interpretation is still inappropriate
for the single Hamiltonian constraint since it would eliminate time evo-
lution. However, as mentioned above, reparametrizations are ‘embedding
preserving’ and simply relabel phase space curves without changing their
image. If we accept that the standard of isomorphism for phase space
curves is given by the mathematical theory of curves, then transformations
that do not change the image of the curve clearly should be classified as
isomorphic. In this context, curves related by reparametrizations can be
taken to have the same representational capacities and even the shadow
of a remaining hole argument can be deflated a` la Weatherall. Although
interpretational work was crucial in finding the Shape Dynamics solution
to the problem of refoliation, once such a representationally adequate for-
malism has been constructed, there should not remain substantive debates
as to the representational capacities of the relevant mathematical objects.
The fifth response to the problem of refoliations is to stay within canon-
ical general relativity and add in extra mathematical, rather than physical,
ingredients. Such an approach would necessarily involve moving away
from thinking about Lie group actions as relating classes of objects with
identical representational capacities. Rather, the symmetries would have
to be represented in terms of Lie groupoids and we should look to repre-
sent the groupoid of diffeomorphisms between space-like embeddings of
hyper-surfaces within Lorentzian manifolds. Although some work is this
direction was attempted by Isham and Kuchar (1985b, 1985a), it is only
relatively recently that this (rather fearsome) mathematical challenge has
been addressed in earnest. In particular, Blohmann et al. (2010) argue
that the Poisson bracket relations among the initial value constraints for
the Einstein evolution equations correspond to those among the constant
sections of a Lie algebroid over the infinite jets of paths in the space of Rie-
mannian metrics on a manifold. The goal of this project is to reconstruct
the canonical formalism such that the constraint equations may be seen as
the vanishing of something like a momentum map for a groupoid of sym-
metries. In such circumstances, the isomorphisms relevant for refoliation
would be explicitly constructed, and one would expect Weatherall’s defla-
tionary strategy to be available. However, it remains to be seen whether
and how this project will be completed. For the time being, we can simply
note that the representational ambiguity that enables us to ‘reinflate’ the
hole argument is closely related to that which causes the problem of time,
and is also an area of current research in the mathematical foundations of
canonical gravity. This ‘problem of refoliation’ is also of great importance
to the quantization of gravity. In the next section, we will consider the rela-
tion between the problem of time (and the hole argument) in the context of
the ‘problem of quantization’, before concluding with some methodologi-
cal morals.
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3.2 The Problem of Quantization
If the problem of time were simply the problem of refoliation then, al-
though it would perhaps still be a problem of interest to contemporary
physicists, the problem of time would surely not be a problem of real con-
sequence. The principal goal of work towards the canonical reformulation
of general relativity was always to enable a quantization of the theory. For
within the canonical formulation of a classical theory, we are accustomed
to see the seeds of a quantum theory in terms of the Lie algebra of observ-
ables induced by the symplectic structure of phase space. Since canonical
general relativity is a constrained phase space theory, one seeks to apply a
version of canonical quantization designed for such constrained Hamilto-
nian theories. This is the Dirac constraint quantization procedure (Dirac
1964, Henneaux and Teitelboim 1992). Setting aside a legion of technical
issues, if one (rather heuristically) presses ahead and applies Dirac con-
straint quantization to canonical general relativity, one runs directly into
a conceptual problem. Following ‘Dirac quantization’, one follows a pro-
cedure that involves: i) first promoting the first-class constraints of the
classical constrained Hamiltonian theory to operators acting upon a kine-
matical Hilbert space, Hkin ; and then ii) imposing the constraint operators
as restrictions on physically possible states, and in doing so constructing
a physical Hilbert space, Hphys. When this procedure is applied to Hamilto-
nian constraints, an immediate conceptual worry arises since, by definition,
the only physical states now permitted will be energy eigenstates. Apply-
ing Dirac constraint quantization to canonical general relativity leads to a
‘frozen formalism’ with all physical information supposedly encoded in a
Wheeler-DeWitt equation of the form ‘Hˆ |Ψ〉 = 0’.
So far as it goes, this story is rather incomplete. Neither the kinemat-
ical Hilbert space, nor the physical Hilbert space, nor the Wheeler-deWitt
equation expressed in these terms are well-defined mathematical objects,
and the technical challenge of rigorously enacting a constraint quantiza-
tion of canonical general relativity is a significant one (Thiemann 2007).
Although our purpose here is not to review the relevant technicalities in
detail, there is one point of particular relevance to our argument. We saw in
Equation (6) that the Poisson bracket of the Hamiltonian constraints with
themselves close with structure functions. This is what prevents closure of
the constraints as an algebra, and means that the associated set of transfor-
mations on phase space are a groupoid rather than a group. This is also
what blocks application of the more sophisticated modern cousin of Dirac
constraint quantization: the procedure of ‘Refined Algebraic Quantization’
(RAQ) (Giulini and Marolf 1999) that is applicable to the momentum but
not Hamiltonian constraints. In the RAQ approach one defines the physi-
cal states by ‘group averaging’ Ψ over the manifold associated with the Lie
algebra of the constraints. This involves constructing a quantum mechan-
ical analogue to the classical gauge orbits within the kinematical Hilbert
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space Hkin (Corichi 2008). Any two points along these ‘quantum gauge
orbits’ yield the same physical state and so, in group averaging, we are
explicitly removing kinematical redundancy at the level of states. It is at
this point that we can note, against Rickles (2005) and in agreement with
Pooley (2006), that there cannot be a quantum analogue to the hole argu-
ment driven by the momentum constraints. The equivalence classes are
not made up of physical states, and one could not, even in principle, con-
sider solutions which contain different representatives of the same physical
state. In constructing the physical Hilbert space we removed precisely the
kinematical redundancy that makes the classical hole argument via the
momentum constraints possible. This should perhaps be no surprise: a
reliable quantization procedure should be expected to identify objects that
are equivalent up to the relevant notion of isomorphism in the classical
theory.9
This brings us to our central point. When we do not have an appro-
priate standard of isomorphism between a group of mathematical objects
in our classical formalism, we have no good guide to the construction of
an appropriate quantum theory. Thus, the problem of refoliation, wherein
the formalism of canonical gravity does not provide a natural standard of
isomorphism between phase space curves related by refoliation, becomes
a problem of quantization, wherein we do not have a reliable quantiza-
tion prescription for removing the kinematical redundancy relating to re-
foliations. Although there are quantization techniques that are formally
applicable to Hamiltonian constraints – for example the master constraint
program (Thiemann 2006) – these all inevitably lead to a timeless formal-
ism, with the universe trapped in an energy eigenstate. Moreover, within
such approaches, no means is available to represent refoliations within
a kinematical Hilbert space, and thus it seems questionable whether the
right redundancy is being disposed of. In a sense, the quantum aspect of
the problem of time exists precisely for the same reason that the canonical
hole argument is resistant to deflation: refoliations do not admit a repre-
sentation as a group of transformations on phase space. Thus, in trying
to find a solution to the problem of refoliations, we will also be working
towards solving the problem of quantizing gravity.
4 Methodological Morals
In this paper, we hope to have illustrated two methodological morals that
we believe philosophers of physics would do well to heed. First, interpre-
tational debate regarding the foundations of a physical theory would do
well to track ambiguity regarding the representational capacity of math-
ematical objects within that theory. Whilst we could always simply resist
9At least to the extent that we expect quantization to eliminate ‘surplus structure’
encoded in the local symmetries of a gauge theory. See (Gryb and The´bault 2014).
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the normative force of Weatherall’s demand that ‘isomorphic mathematical
models in physics should be taken to have the same representational capac-
ities’ (Weatherall 2015, p.4), we think the hole argument and the problem of
time demonstrate that fruitful and exciting interpretive work often lies in
the mathematically ambiguous terrain that is beyond its scope. When we
have no natural standard of isomorphism between mathematical objects in
a physical theory, debate regarding the representational capacity of these
objects is of immediate importance for the articulation of the theory.
Along similar lines, our second moral is that interpretational debate
should track problems with some connection to theory articulation and
development.10 The representational capacity of objects within a theory is
an issue of real importance to the extent to which it potentially bears upon
the articulation and development of a theory. In these terms, the debate
about the ontology of classical spacetime is most interesting and important
to the extent to which it has relevance to the pursuit of a quantum theory
of gravity. By considering the hole argument in the context of the problem
of time we see that the debate can have such a bearing.
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